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Transmission of Human Capital across Four Generations: 












Most  previous  studies  on  intergenerational  transmission  of  human  capital  are  restricted  to  two 
generations - between the parent and the child generation. In this paper we investigate if there is an 
independent effect of the grandparent and the great grandparent generations in this process. We use a 
dataset where we are able to link individual measures of life time earnings for three generation and 
data  on  educational  attainments  of  four  generations.  We  first  do  conventional  regressions  and 
transition matrices for life time earnings measures and educational attainments adding variables for the 
grandparent and great grandparent generations, respectively. We find that grandparents and even great 
grandparents significantly influence earnings and education. We then estimate the so called Becker-
Tomes model using the educational attainment of the great grandparent generation as an instrumental 
variable. We fail to find support for the model‟s predictions. 
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1  Introduction 
Although  most  families  have  close  connections  with  their  grandparent  or  even  great 
grandparent generations and most people would admit strong influences and transmission of 
different  resources  beyond  their  parent  generation,  economic  analysis  of  intergenerational 
links  is  almost  exclusively  concerned  with  the  relation  between  the  parent  and  child 
generations. Dynamic macroeconomic models e.g. of human and physical capital investments, 
fertility and inequality as well as and models of cultural transmission and models of how 
parents can affect various aspects of their children‟s lives focus on the link between two 
consecutive generations (Diamond, 1965, Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986, Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura, 1990, Galore and Zeira, 1993, Bisin and Verdier, 2000, Mulligan, 1995, and 
Saez Marti and Sjögren, 2008). Also empirical studies on intergenerational income mobility, 
surveyed  in  Solon  (1999)  and  Black  and  Devereux  (2010),  are  with  a  few  exceptions 
restricted  to  two  generations,
3  and the by far most important model for intergenerational 
transmission of human capital   –  the  Becker-Tomes  model  –  relates  financial  and  other 
parental resources of the parent generation to the outcome of the child generation. 
The  possible  independent  effects  of  generations  beyond  the  parent  generation  have 
important implications for how we view income inequality in a given point of time as well as 
how we interpret  intergenerational transmission of human capital.  Income inequality in  a 
mobile society is seen as more justifiable since the individual‟s relative economic position to 
a larger extent is linked to the individual‟s own choices and economic performance, rather 
than inheritance from previous generations. An often used example (see e.g. Borjas, 2009), 
departs from an initial income difference on 20 percent between two families. If there is an 
intergenerational  correlation  on  0.3  we  expect  only  30  percent  of  this  difference,  or  6 
percentage  points,  remains  in  the  second  generation.  In  the  third  generation  difference  is 
almost entirely eliminated, since only 1.8 percent is expected to remain. This example relies, 
however,  critically  on  the  assumption  that  the  intergenerational  transmission  process  of 
human  capital  has  a  memory  of  only  one  period.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  the  income 
convergence will take longer. 
In this paper we investigate if there is an independent effect of the grandparent and the 
great grandparent generation in the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Is the 
                                                       
3 Examples of some studies that focus on estimating relationship between outcomes (education or occupation) 
for grandparents and grandchildren are Behrman and Taubman (1985), Maurin (2002), Sacerdote (2004), Sauder 
(2006) and Warren and Hauser (1997).   3 
 
AR(1)  process  used  in  most  studies  on  intergenerational  income  mobility  sufficient  for 
describing the income process across generations and to predict the income distribution for 
future  generations?  To  answer  this  question  we  use  an  exceptional  data  set  containing 
measures  of  life  time  earnings  for  three  consecutive  generations  and  data  on  educational 
attainments for four generations. The data set is based on a survey of all third graders in 
Sweden‟s third largest city, Malmö, and its suburbs, in 1938. This index generation has been 
followed until retirement and the identity and information on parents, spouses, children and 
grandchildren have been added. The first generation is, on average, born late in the nineteenth 
century and the fourth generation is typically finishing their education in the early twenty-first 
century. Altogether there are 901 complete families, i.e. families with education data available 
on at least one individual in each of four consecutive generations. 
The empirical analysis is carried out in two steps. First, we estimate AR(1) models using 
OLS to investigate whether or not the analysis built on data from two consecutive generations 
can predict the correlations between the incomes of the child and grandparent generations for 
life time income and between the child and the great grandparent generations for educational 
attainments. We explore heterogeneity in the intergenerational links in different parts of the 
income  and  educational  distribution  using  an  analysis  built  on  transition  matrices.  We 
conclude  that  grandparents  and  even  great  grandparents  influence  child  earnings  and 
education more than predicted by the correlation between two consecutive generations. As a 
second  step  we  test  implications  of  the  Becker-Tomes  model  for  educational  attainments 
using instrumental variables techniques. This is feasible since we have data on educational 
attainments of the great grandparent generation, which is used as an instrumental variable for 
the  educational  attainments  of  the  grandparent  generation.  This  approach  was  suggested 
already in Becker and Tomes (1986), but because of lack of data on four generations, has 
never been implemented. We fail to find support for the model‟s prediction. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data set, discusses the construction 
of variables and provides some descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. In 
section 3 we present descriptive estimations from associating outcomes of children with those 
of  parents,  grandparents  (income  and  education)  and  great  grandparents  (education).  In 
section 4 we present the simple Becker-Tomes model of intergenerational transmission and 
test it using data on education spanning four generations. Section 5 concludes. 4 
 
2  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the dataset consisting of information for individuals 
from four generations of the same family. The data originally stems from the so called Malmö 
Study, a survey initiated in 1938 by a team of educational researchers.
4 All pupils attending 
third grade (at age 10) in any school in city of Malmö with suburbs (n=1,542) were part of the 
original survey and constitute the  index, or second, generation. The original purpose was to 
analyze the correlation between social surroundings and cognitive ability. Hence a host of 
family background information was collected, including parental earnings for several years 
and father‟s education. The Malmö Study has since been extended with information from both 
several rounds of follow up surveys and register data over the years. The last collection of 
data using questionnaires to the initially sampled children was conducted 55 years after the 
first survey, i.e. in 1993.
5 By that time, most of the individuals had reached retirement age. 
Figure 1 Schematic picture of the GEMS database. 
   
                                                       
4 The material was originally collected by Siver Hallgren and developed by Torsten Husén. 
5 In 1993 69% of the third and fourth generations lived in the county of Skåne, 8% lived in the county of 
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We  have  extended  the  data  in  several  ways.  We  have  manually  added  church  book 
information on date of birth and death of the parents of the index generation. These parents 
constitute the first generation and were born between 1865 and 1912. We have also added 
register  information  on  the  second  generation‟s  children  and  grandchildren,  as  well  as 
information on the spouses of the index generation, i.e., the second parent of these children 
and  also  of  the  grandchildren.  The  resulting  dataset  consists  of  information  on  four 
generations of the same families. The average birth year of the first generation (G1) is 1898; 
the second, the index generation (G2) is 1928; the third generation‟s, the children of the index 
generation (G3), average birth year is 1956; and, finally, the average birth year of the grand 
children of the index generation (G4) is 1994. 
In  the  appendix  we  give  a  short  historical  overview  related  to  Malmö  and  Sweden, 
focusing on the evolvement of institutions of likely importance to intergenerational mobility 
and the welfare state in Sweden during the relevant time period. 
2.1  Data on Educational Attainment 
The  measure  of  educational  attainments  for  the  first  generation  is  based  on  occupational 
classification for fathers from a survey in 1938. This variable was constructed by educational 
researchers at that time so it should be reliable at least regarding the educational requirements 
for different occupations at that time. However, some of these fathers may of course have 
been over- or undereducated for their positions. 
For the second to fourth generations we have added high quality educational level data 
from national education registers. For the second generation we mainly use data from 1985, 
for  the  third  and  fourth  generations  from  2009.  For  all  generations  we  transform  the 
educational level measure into years of schooling based on the required number of years that 
has to be completed for each level.
6 To avoid the problem that some children in the youngest 
generation may still be in school at the time of data collection, we restrict the analysis of years 
of education to individuals that are at least 25 years of age in 2009, hence e xcluding those 
born after 1984. 
                                                       
6 The main variable years of schooling is created using information taken from either the education register or 
the census. With detailed information on completed level of education, we construct years of schooling in the 
following way: 7 for (old) primary school, 9 for (new) compulsory schooling, 9.5 for (old) post-primary school 
(realskola), 11 for short high school, 12 for long high school, 14 for short university, 15.5 for long university, 
and 19 for a PhD. For those few individuals in the second generation where registry information for 1985 is 
missing, we use survey information from 1964. The education information from 1964 is in 6 levels, and probably 
of less quality than for 1985 or 2009. The conversion is one by imputing years of schooling by regressing the 
years of schooling variable in 1985 on indicators for the 1964 using all individuals for which educational info is 
available in both years. For individuals in the third generation with missing education data, we instead draw on 
registry information from 2005 and 1985.  6 
 
To further increase the  amount of  available observations for the analysis  of education 
transmission, we also construct a measure of whether or not the individual has completed an 
academic track in high school. This is a strong predictor of whether or not the individual 
continues to higher education. We are then able to include children born until 1990. This 
increases the sample by about 35 percent and hence makes any sample selection bias less 
problematic. 
2.2  Measures of Life Time Earnings 
The  amount  of  earnings  information  available  differs  across  generations.  For  the  first 
generation, i.e. the parents of the men and women from the original survey, we have annual 
earnings for the years 1929, 1933, 1937, 1938 and 1942 for fathers. For the second generation 
(most of them born in 1928) we have earnings information already from 1948 if the individual 
belongs to the original Malmö sample. From 1985 and onwards we have earnings information 
for every single year, and before that for every third, fourth or fifth year. For the other parent 
of the third generation individuals, we have earnings information from 1948 if they cohabited 
with  the Malmö-parent  and from  1968 if they  did  not.  For the third  generation we have 
earnings information from 1968 and onwards. The fourth generation is excluded from the 
analysis  of  earnings  transmission.  Although  there  is  earnings  information  available  from 
1968,  too  large  a  fraction  of  the  fourth  generation  is  too  young  to  construct  meaningful 
measures of life time earnings. The earnings data for the first generation, and for the second 
generation up to 1968, are manually collected from the local tax authorities. Earnings data 
from 1968 and onwards are based on register information. The earnings measure for the first 
generation is calculated as the sum of work and capital income, whereas capital income is not 
included in the earnings measure for the later generations. 
Although the quality and amount of earnings information both differ across generations, 
we typically cover the most important years in the working life of parents belonging to the 
first  three  generations.  For  the  first  generation  we  observe  father‟s  earnings  when  their 
children surveyed in the Malmö study were age one to fourteen. The typical father in our 
earnings estimation sample is born in 1896, and hence have earnings observed between age 
33 and 46. For the second generation, the men and women are typically born in 1928 (as is the 
case for the children in the Malmö study) or around these years (as is the case for the “other” 
parent of the Malmö study children). These men and women were born between 1888 and 
1957, our coverage of their lifetime earnings depends partly on if they are cohabiting with 
someone from the Malmö cohort, and partly when they are born. For the third generation, 7 
 
typically born in the mid 1950s, we observe earnings from 1968 to 2008, hence covering most 
of their working life (They are born between 1943 and 1981, and more than 80 percent are 
born between 1950 and 1965). For the first generation, we typically observe earnings at 5 
occasions over 14 years, for the second generation typically 15 observations over more than 
40 years, and for the third generation, typically 20 observations over 40 years. 
Because of the detailed earnings information, we can construct very good measures of 
lifetime earnings for the men in the first three generations. We compute our earnings measure 
in the following way: Utilizing all earnings data available (as long as we observed positive 
earnings a given year and excluding the observations when the individuals are very young: 19 
years  of  age  for  the  first  generation,  23  for  the  second  and  27  for  the  third)  for  each 
individual, we regressed log-earnings on a cubic in birth year as well as year dummies.
7  
 
                                                 
                
                
 
We obtain the residual for each individual-year cell it, and then compute the mean residual for 
each individual. We use the individual specific mean of the residual, i.e. the stable part of 
individual earnings, as our measure of life time earnings used as the dependent variable in the 
earnings regressions. 
2.3  Descriptive Statistics 
For  education  there  are  901  complete  families,  i.e.  with  data  available  on  at  least  one 
individual in each generation, for four consecutive generations.
8 For earnings there are 730 
families with earnings information available for  one  male member of the family  in three 
consecutive generations. The main reason for attrition of families is lack of off-spring, and to 
a  lesser  extent  missing  information  on  earnings  or  education.   Since  earnings  are  less 
informative for women in the earlier years, we restrict the analysis of earnings associations to 
sons, fathers and grandfathers.  Note that for roughly half of the earnings sample, the  male 
family member  in the second generation (the father) is not the biological son of the  male 
                                                       
7 This is the approach taken in e.g. Haider and Solon, 2006 and Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006. Life cycle bias 
should hence not be an issue here, as we have access to reasonable lifetime income measures for both parents 
and children. See also Lee and Solon, 2009.  
8 We have 901 complete families with four generations when we include 4 generation children born through 1990. For this 
sample the education measure for the fourth generation is used is academic high school track. In order to obtain a meaningful 
measure of years of education for the fourth generation we restrict the analysis to children born before 1986, resulting in 673 
complete families. 8 
 
member of the family in the first generation (the grandfather), but instead is the son in law. 
This almost doubles the earnings sample.
9  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by generation and gender for the samples used in this 
study.  We show statistics corresponding to the individuals in our estimation sample for 
education (four generations separated by gender) and earnings (three generations of men).  
The first column shows means and standard deviations for the fathers of the children in the 
index generation (generation 2). These 905 fathers were on average born in 1896 and had 7.3 
years of schooling. The next two columns show descriptive statistics for  those in the index 
generation (first interviewed in 1938 and typically born in 1928) as well as mothers and 
fathers of the children in the third generation. For this second generation  typically born in 
1928, there are 470 men that acquired 10.2 years of schooling and 435 women that acquired 
9.5 years, on average.
10 Note that earnings figures for men in the second and third generation 
pertain to sons and grandsons of the first generation of men as well as the male spouse of the 
daughters and granddaughters belonging to the index and the next generation. Hence,  the 
dispersion in the year-of-birth variable is much higher for the men in the index generation.  
The last two columns show descriptive statistics for the descendants of the earlier  three 
generations that are old enough to be included in the regressions (27 years in 2008 for 
earnings regressions and 25 (19) years in 2009 for education (academic high school track) 
regressions).  The average residual  of  log earnings, with means and standard d eviations 
reported in the third row, summarizes the earnings measure actually used the in estimations.
11 
 
                                                       
9 As a check, we also estimated transmission coefficients for education using these sample restrictions. The 
estimates are then very similar to the ones using only individuals that are biologically related across the four 
generations (which are the estimates reported in Table 2). 
10 Although not shown, earnings increased from about 86,000 SEK (calculated in 1933) for the men in the first 
generation to 311,000 SEK (in 2000) for the men in the third generation, all expressed in 2010 year prizes.   
11 Note that they are based on averages  (and hence standard deviation<1) and are negative because those with 
fewer years of earnings data have lower earnings. 9 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
   
Generation 1 
 (great grandparents) 
 
Generation 2  
(grandparents) 
 





               
  Great grandfather  Grandmother  Grandfather  Mother  Father  Daughter  Son 
Variable  (1)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
               
Years of schooling  7.30  9.53  10.15  12.05  12.11  12.95  12.42 
  (1.60)  (2.67)  (2.96)  (2.47)  (2.59)  (1.98)  (2.13) 
  [5,14]  [7,19]  [7,20]  [7,20]  [7,20]  [7,20]  [7,20] 
               
Academic high school track            0.55  0.44 
            (0.50)  (0.50) 
            [0,1]  [0,1] 
               
Average residual log earnings  -0.047    -0.018    -0.121     
  (0.529)    (0.637)    (0.763)     
  [-1.74,2.76]    [-2.71,2.26]    [-4.11,1.90]     
               
Year of birth (Education)  1896.12  1927.91  1927.87  1954.67  1954.53  1981.45  1981.49 
  (7.20)  (0.40)  (0.40)  (4.90)  (4.46)  (6.30)  (6.35) 
  [1859,1910]  [1925,1930]  [1926,1929]  [1944,1970]  [1943,1969]  [1962,1990]  [1962,1990] 
               
Year of birth (Earnings)  1895.70    1926.73    1956.69     
  (7.48)    (3.27)    (5.54)     
  [1865,1910]    [1888,1947]    [1943,1981]     
               
Number of observations (Education)   905  435  470  831  722  1,451  1,548 
Number of observations (Earnings)   803    1,174    1,174     
               
Notes: The education numbers are calculated for the observations used in table 2 (column 1) and table 3 (columns 1-2) and the earnings numbers are calculated for the 
observations used in Table 5. The statistics for year of schooling for generation 4 is calculated for those born before 1985 (887 daughters and 936 sons).  10 
 
3  Results 
3.1  Intergenerational persistence in educational attainments 
Table 2 shows the first set of results: the estimated transmission coefficients for education 
across the four generations under study. All estimates are results from estimation of bivariate 
regression models such as  
 
                   , where              (2) 
 
and where    is the outcome of the child and      is outcome of the parent (j=1), grandparent 
(j=2) or great grandparent (j=3). Since the last generation in many cases has not yet completed 
their  education  at  the  date  of  the  data  collection,  the  last  row  in  Table  2  reports  linear 
probability model estimates of the association between the probability of having completed an 
academic  oriented  high  school  track  and  earlier  generations‟  educational  attainments 
measured  in  years  of  education.  The  estimates  (standard  errors)  are  outcomes  from 
regressions using unstandardized variables. We report standardized estimates in brackets. 
Table 2 shows two interesting outcomes. First, the statistically significant 0.137 estimate 
for the association between the great grandfather‟s educational attainment and that of the great 
grandchild  shows  that  there  is  a  persistent  correlation  despite  the  fact  that  there  are  two 
generations,  or  on  average  75  years,  between  the  two  studied  generations.  Second,  the 
association between educational outcomes of the great grandparent generation and the child 
generation as well as between the great grandparent generation and the parent generation is 
stronger than what would be expected if we were to predict these correlations based on the 
correlation between the adjacent generations involved.  
The second result is easily obtained by multiplying the diagonal elements in the transition 
matrix. For example, multiplying the correlation between the first and second generations, 
0.607, with that between the second and third, 0.281, yields a prediction for the correlation 
between the first and the third generation on 0.171. By applying the delta-method we obtain 
an approximate of bounds for the standard error for this prediction between 0.040 and 0.046.
12 
                                                       
12 The approximation of the  variance for the product of  1  and  2  ,  where  1   is the  correlation  between 
generation  one  and  two  and  2    is  the  correlation  between  generation  two  and  three,  is 




1 2              .  Since  we  are  not  able  to  estimate 
2 1   ,  we  instead  depart  from  our 11 
 
These approximated bounds enable us to formally test and reject that the obtained prediction 
is equal to the correlation between the first and the third generation, which was estimated to 
0.375.  
Table 2 Matrix of estimated transmission coefficients across generations: Education 
   
 
Years of Schooling – 
great grandparent 
(1) 
Years of Schooling 
– grandparent 
(2) 
Years of Schooling – 
parent 
(3) 
       







   
       












       
















       
       















       
Notes: Each reported estimate is from a separate regression of the child‟s education on education of education of the ancestor. 
All regressions control for a quadratic in birth year of both generations. The reported standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered on families. Standardized estimates are reported in brackets. 
 
Table  3  reports  the  results  when  we  have  estimated  the  intergenerational  transmission 
coefficients separately by gender of offspring and ancestor. The most striking feature of these 
estimates  is  that  the  intergenerational  correlation  in  educational  attainments  seems  to  be 
independent  of  the  gender  of  both  ancestor  and  offspring.  For  example,  the  correlation 
between the first and the third generation is almost the same for males and females in the first 
generation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
estimates of 
1   , 
2   and the fact that the maximum correlation coefficient value is 1 to obtain an upper bound 
for 
2 1   . For the lower bound 
2 1   is set to 0. 12 
 
Table 3 Matrix of estimated transmission coefficients across generations: Years of education 
  great grandfather  grandmother  grandfather  mother  father 





       





       













   













   




















































































Notes: Each reported estimate is from a separate regression of the child‟s education on education of education of the ancestor. All regressions control for a quadratic in birth year of both generations. The reported 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on families. Standardized estimates are reported in brackets.  
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Changes in education distributions and possible changes in the meaning of a particular 
number  of  years  of  education  over  time  and  possible  non-linearities  in  the  transmission 
process are not fully captured in the linearly estimated transmission coefficients. We therefore 
compute  intergenerational  transmission  probabilities  across  education  categories  and 
corresponding  odds  ratios.  The  results  are  reported  in  Tables  4a  through  4d.  For  each 
generation  we  define  four  levels  of  education,  from  compulsory  to  university  education. 
Transmission probabilities and odds ratios confirm the main result from Table 2, namely that 
there is substantial persistence in the attained education level across generations. In particular, 
Table 4c shows that there is a much higher probability that an individual belongs to the same 
education  level  as  his  ancestor  even  after  four  generations  than  to  belong  to  any  other 
education  category.  In  addition,  these  transition  probabilities  indicate  a  presence  of  non-
linearities: There seems to be higher persistence in the upper end of the education distribution. 
People with more than compulsory education in the first generation are on average between 
49 and 67 percent more likely to have great grandchildren with university education, whereas 
people with only compulsory schooling are 3 percent more likely to have great grandchildren 
with the same educational attainments. 
Table 4a Education of children (generation 2) conditional on education of parents 
(generation 1), transition probabilities and odds ratios 
    Education of children (generation 2)  All 
Education of  
parents 
(generation 1) 




High school   University  Pi. 
Obsi. 
 Compulsory  P1j  0.50  0.32  0.14  0.04  0.85 
 
P1j/P.j  1.12  1.01  0.86  0.54  765 
Post compulsory:  P2j  0.23  0.31  0.31  0.16  0.08 
Some vocational  P2j/P.j  0.50  0.99  1.85  2.19  75 
Post compulsory:  P3j  0.08  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.04 
theoretical (short)  P3j/P.j  0.18  1.04  1.79  4.08  37 
High School/  P4j  0.11  0.18  0.25  0.46  0.03 
University  P4j/P.j  0.24  0.58  1.51  6.37  28 
   
 
       
All  P.j  0.45  0.31  0.17  0.07   
 
Obs.j  408  281  150  66  905 
Notes: Education generation 1: compulsory max 8 yrs, post-compulsory: vocational 9 yrs, post-compulsory: theoretical (Real 
skola) 10 years, high school or university: min 12 years 
Education generation 2: compulsory max 9 yrs, post-compulsory: short theoretical or vocational high school (Real or short 
high school) 10-11 yrs, Theoretical High school 12-14 yrs, university: min 15 yrs 
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Table 4b Education of grandchildren (generation 3) conditional on education of 
grandparents (generation 1), transition probabilities and odds ratios 








High school   University  Pi. 
Obsi. 
 Compulsory  P1j  0.20  0.40  0.26  0.15  0.85 
 
P1j/P.j  1.08  1.09  0.98  0.79  1317 
Post compulsory:  P2j  0.13  0.23  0.30  0.34  0.08 
Some vocational  P2j/P.j  0.69  0.64  1.11  1.84  128 
Post compulsory:  P3j  0.10  0.15  0.33  0.42  0.04 
theoretical (short)  P3j/P.j  0.55  0.41  1.24  2.23  60 
High School/  P4j  0.02  0.13  0.29  0.56  0.03 
University  P4j/P.j  0.12  0.34  1.09  3.01  48 
   
 
       
All  P.j  0.18  0.37  0.27  0.19   
 
Obs.j  280  567  416  290  1553 
Education generation 1: compulsory max 8 yrs, post-compulsory: vocational 9 yrs, post-compulsory: theoretical (Real skola) 
10 years, high school or university: min 12 years 
Education generation 3: compulsory max 9 yrs, post-compulsory: short theoretical or vocational high school (Real or short 
high school) 10-11 yrs, Theoretical High school 12-14 yrs, university: min 15 yrs 
 
Table 4c Education of great grandchildren (generation 4) conditional on education of 
great grandparents (generation 1), transition probabilities and odds ratios. (families 
with 4th generation born before 1985) 








High school   University  Pi. 
Obsi. 
 Compulsory  P1j  0.10  0.16  0.50  0.24  0.89 
 
P1j/P.
j  1.03  1.05  1.01  0.93  1620 
Post compulsory:  P2j  0.09  0.07  0.46  0.38  0.07 
Some vocational 
P2j/P.
j  0.93  0.43  0.94  1.49  121 
Post compulsory:  P3j  0.04  0.13  0.40  0.43  0.03 
theoretical (short) 
P3j/P.
j  0.43  0.82  0.82  1.67  47 
High School/  P4j  0.06  0.11  0.43  0.40  0.02 
University 
P4j/P.
j  0.58  0.74  0.87  1.57  35 
   
 
       
All  P.j  0.10  0.16  0.49  0.25   
 
Obs.j  179  283  897  464  1823 
Education generation 1: compulsory max 8 yrs, post-compulsory: vocational 9 yrs, post-compulsory: theoretical 
(Real skola) 10 years, high school or university: min 12 years 
Education generation 4: compulsory max 9 yrs, post-compulsory: short theoretical or vocational high school 




Table 4d Education of great grandchildren (generation 4) conditional on education of 
great grandparents (generation 1), transition probabilities and odds ratios. (families 
with 4th generation born before 1990 ) 




  Compulsory or 
vocational highschool 
track 
Academic highschool track  Pi. 
Obsi. 
 Compulsory  P1j  0.53  0.47  0.86 
 
P1j/P.j  1.04  0.95  2567 
Post compulsory:  P2j  0.40  0.60  0.08 
Some vocational  P2j/P.j  0.79  1.22  238 
Post compulsory:  P3j  0.38  0.62  0.04 
theoretical (short)  P3j/P.j  0.75  1.26  111 
High School/  P4j  0.29  0.71  0.03 
University  P4j/P.j  0.57  1.44  83 
    0.51  0.49   
All  P.j  1521  1478  2999 
 
Obs.j  0.53  0.47  0.86 
Education generation 1: compulsory max 8 yrs, post-compulsory: vocational 9 yrs, post-compulsory: theoretical (Real skola) 
10 years, high school or university: min 12 years 
Education generation 4: Compulsory or vocational highschool track, academic track measured at earliest age 19 
 
3.2  Intergenerational persistence in earnings 
Table  5  shows  the  estimates  of  intergenerational  earnings  mobility  between  the  first  and 
second generation, the second and third generations as well as between the first and third 
generation,  respectively.  Although  Swedish  society  has  undergone  fundamental  changes 
between  the  most  active  period  of  the  first  generation  born  around  1900  and  the  third 
generation mostly born in the 1950s and 60s, the correlation in earnings between consecutive 
generations seems to be quite stable: 0.356 between the first and the second generation and 
0.303 between the second and third. This finding is very much in line with what have been 
found in previous studies (see e.g. Black and Devereux, 2011, for an overview). 
The results in Table 5 allow us to predict the earnings mobility between the first and third 
generations from the two two-generation mobility measures. This gives us a prediction of 
0.108, which is substantially lower than the estimate  of 0.184 obtained from data. Again 
applying the bounding exercise for the delta method as explained in footnote 11 gives an 
estimate of the standard error between 0.020  and 0.028. A t-test of equality between the 
predicted and the estimated three-generation mobility measure gives a t-value between 1.47 
and 1.58, i.e., indicating a marginally significant difference. 
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Table 5 Matrix of estimated transmission coefficients across generations: log 
earnings of male offspring regressed on log earnings of male ancestor  






     








     











     
Notes:  Each reported estimate is from a separate regression of the son‟s residual log earnings on residual log earnings of the 
ancestor. The earnings measures are average residual log-earnings from a regression of log earnings on a cubic in birth year 
and year dummies (see section 2). The reported standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on families. Standardized 
estimates are reported in brackets. 
 
As in the case of education, it is interesting to explore a presence of non-linearities in the 
transmission of earnings across generations. We do this by means of transmission matrices. 
Table 6 shows transition matrices for income quintiles across generations. The first panel 
reports the transition probabilities between the first and the second generation; the second 
panel the corresponding figures for the second and third generation; finally, the third panel 
shows the transitions between the first and the third generations.  
There is one results of particular interest revealed in Table 6: the persistence, in particular 
across  two  consecutive  generations,  seems  to  be  higher  in  the  higher  end  of  the  income 
distribution. The highest persistence in all three panels is found for the fifth quintile, i.e. the 
top 20 percent of earnings. As much as 34 percent of the grandchildren of the individuals in 
the  fifth  quintile  remain  in  the  very  top  of  the  income  distribution.  Interestingly,  the 
persistence in this cell is almost as high when we compare grandfathers and grandsons (first 
and third generations) as when the grandsons are instead compared to their fathers (second 
and third generations). 




Table 6 Transition matrices: offspring earnings quintile conditional on ancestor’s 
earnings quintile.  




Earnings quintile of offspring 
      Fathers     
Grandfathers  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Q1  0.30  0.29  0.21  0.11  0.10 
Q2  0.25  0.20  0.20  0.23  0.11 
Q3  0.16  0.20  0.26  0.22  0.17 
Q4  0.16  0.18  0.21  0.27  0.18 
Q5  0.14  0.14  0.11  0.18  0.44 
           
      Sons     
Fathers  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Q1  0.31  0.26  0.17  0.18  0.09 
Q2  0.20  0.24  0.19  0.20  0.18 
Q3  0.21  0.18  0.28  0.18  0.15 
Q4  0.15  0.18  0.22  0.22  0.23 
Q5  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.23  0.35 
           
      Sons     
Grandfathers  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Q1  0.19  0.23  0.21  0.24  0.14 
Q2  0.23  0.22  0.23  0.17  0.14 
Q3  0.25  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.16 
Q4  0.17  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.22 
Q5  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.18  0.34 
           
           
           
Notes:  fathers and sons; 774 families   
 
If  we  briefly  summarize  results  from  our  descriptive  estimations  they  point  toward  a 
surprisingly  strong  association  between  grandparental  education  /earnings  and 
education/earnings  of  grandchildren,  and  between  great  grandparental  education  and 
education of great grandchildren. Hence, regression toward the mean takes longer time in 
Sweden than suggested by the in comparatively low estimates of intergenerational persistence 
found for two consecutive generations. In addition, transition matrices reveal that there is 
higher persistence in the upper end of the education and income distributions. We also find 
that simply taking the square of the intergenerational elasticity does not give an accurate 
picture of what we find using children and grandparents, suggesting that the basic assumption 
that intergenerational transmission follows an AR(1) process does not hold.  
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4  A test of the Becker-Tomes model of intergenerational 
transmission of human capital 
We  proceeds  to  investigate  the  predictions  of  the  Becker-Tomes  model  using  the  very 
instrumental variables technique suggested by Becker and Tomes, but that has never been 
implemented for lack of data on several generations. 
4.1  The model and its predictions 
Consider the simplest version of the classic Becker‐Tomes (BT) model of intergenerational 
transmission of human capital across generations: 
 
(1)                            
 
(2)                      
 
This  simple model assumes;  first,  that  income  (y) of the child-generation  t is  a linear 
additive function of income in the parental generation t-1 (because of parental investment in 
children‟s human capital, where investment is credit constrained), unobserved endowment or 
ability (e) and an error term, and; second that the unobserved endowment is transmitted across 
generations  through an  AR(1) process.  The model  can be easily modified to  i) explicitly 
describe the relationship for education instead of earnings (as in Plug and Wijverberg, 2005, 
and Sauder, 2006),
13 and to ii)  various functional forms. In the empirical test we perform 
below we use education as a measure of y. 
An  immediate  implication  of  this  model  is  that  a  bivariate  regression  of  children‟s 
income/education on parent‟s income/education leads to overestimation of  , since those with 
higher endowment also have higher income/education. There is, in fact, strong evidence that a 
simple regression of yt on yt‐1 leads to an upward biased estimate of β (see Björklund, Lindahl 
and Plug, 2006, and  Holmlund,  Lindahl  and Plug, 2011). However,  such a  result is  also 
consistent with more complicated transmission processes than suggested in (1) and (2). 
The Becker-Tomes (BT) model in (1) and (2) assumes no direct effect of grandparent‟s on 
grandchildren. Grandparents affect grandchildren only indirectly through the inheritance of 
endowments, or ability, which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. In the presence of 
                                                       
13 In a simple model of human capital transmission between parent and child we then get somewhat different 
interpretations of β, depending of whether yt and yt‐1 represent income or education. For income, we have that   
is the product of the child‟s return to education and parental return on investment in child‟s education, whereas 
for education, we have that   is the product of parental return on investment in child‟s education and parent‟s 
return to own education  
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credit  constraints,  grandparents  also  influence  grandchildren  because  grandparents  have 
invested in the human capital of parents. Interestingly, as discussed in BT, this implies a 
negative  effect  of  grandparents‟  outcome  (yt-2)  on  children‟s  outcome  (yt)  conditional  on 
parent‟s outcome (yt-1).
14 
To see this, insert (2) into (1) which generates (1‟); assume that equation (1) holds across 
all t‟s, so that all the parameters are constant over time, and create a first-order lagged version 




(3)                                                    
 
Note that the intuition for this negative coefficient on     , is that a high      means a low 
    ,  for  given      .  Since,  from  the  first-order  lagged  version  of  (1),  we  have  that 
                  , an OLS regression of children‟s outcome on parent‟s and grandparent‟s 
outcome generate biased estimates: The coefficient on parent‟s earnings/education       will 
be  underestimated  and  the  coefficient  on  grandparents  earnings/education  –    will  be 
overestimated. We therefore need an alternative approach. 
The first serious test of the grandparent‟s coefficient in (3) and hence of the BT model, is 
conducted by Behrman and Taubman (1985). Using a sample of descendents to twins, they 
estimate (3) and find grandparent‟s education to be insignificantly related to grandchildren‟s 
education using OLS, and insignificantly or significantly positive related using IV, where 
uncle‟s education is used as instrument for child‟s education. The sample used is based on a 
peculiar sample of offspring to twins, where the twins where white males born 1917-1927 and 
who served in the military during WWII. Hence, the results are unlikely to be generalizable to 
a more representative population. The offsprings‟ (grandchildren‟s) earnings are measured on 
average at a relatively young age 28, which also can cause well-known problems related to 
life-cycle bias (see Haider and Solon, 2006). Their IV approach was both novel and creative. 
However, it assumes that the education of a twin has no impact on educational attainment of 
                                                       
14 In Solon‟s interpretation: There is a negative effect of grandparents on grandchildren if all of the following is 
true: i) the heritability (or endowment) coefficient is non‐zero; b) human capital investment is productive (credit 
constraints is present); c) the earnings return to human capital is positive; and d) public investment in children‟s 
human capital is not perfectly equalizing. 
15 Equation (3) follows from equations (1) and (2) simply because the latter two equations constitute an AR(1) 
model with an autocorrelated error term, which can be rewritten as an AR(2) model, where the coefficient on the 
first lagged variable will be positive and the coefficient on the second lagged variable will be negative.   
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the co-twin‟s child. This assumption may be questioned since twins often relate closely to as 
adults and may hence influence each other‟s children.  
An alternative approach is used in a study by Sauder (2006) using U.K. data. He finds 
positive  impact  of  grandparent‟s  education  using  OLS,  but  no  effect  using  IV.  The  IV 
approach exploits i) two distinct schooling reforms that took place in 1947 and 1973 in the 
U.K.  and  ii)  mothers‟  birth  order  as  instruments  for  parents  and  grandparents  education. 
However, using these instruments is problematic. First, it is difficult to separate cohort from 
reform effects of reforms that are introduced the same time in the whole nation. Second, birth-
order may also affect post-education outcomes (as found in Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 
2005) through other channels than educational attainment.  
Our  approach,  suggested  already  by  Becker  and  Tomes,  is  to  use  great-grandparents 
education as an instrument for parent‟s education, in a regression of children‟s education on 
parent‟s and grandparent‟s education. The identifying assumption is that great grandparent‟s 
education  has  no  impact  on  great  grandchildren‟s  education,  over  and  above  the  impact 
through  parent‟s  and  grandparent‟s  education.  This  assumption  necessarily  holds  in  the 
Becker-Tomes model (1) and (2). Since we have four generations of data for education, we 
can apply this approach here.  
4.2  Empirical test 
In Table 7 we present results from regression of education of a child on the education of 
parents and grandparents. We show results for years of schooling and academic high school 
track, respectively. In columns 1 and 3, we show results from OLS regressions. We find that 
education of both parents and grandparents is positively related to education of children. 
In columns 2 and 4, we present results from an IV regression were great grandparents 
education is used to instrument for parents education (controlling for grandparents education). 
The first stage estimates are shown at the bottom of column 2. Both first stage estimates are 
highly significant and the F-statistics for education of great grandparents is 30.9 in column 2 
and 47.9 in column 4. Moving to the actual IV estimates in column 2, we find that they are 
very similar and not statistically different from the OLS estimates in column 1.
16 Although a 
95% confidence interval covers a negative value of grandparents‟ education, we conclude that 
our data to not support the prediction of a negative effect from the Becker-Tomes model.
17 
                                                       
16 We have also checked for non-linear effects of schooling of ancestors in the OLS ad IV regressions, but quadratic terms are 
never statistically different from zero.  
17 Although we cannot reject zero effects of the schooling of grandparents in neither colum ns (see row 2), the p -value is 
0.236 in column 2 and 0.189 in column 4.   
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Table 7 Test of the Becker-Tomes model: Coefficients are from OLS and IV 
regressions of children’s education on parent’s and grandparent’s education 
         
  Years of Schooling  Academic highschool track 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
   
   
Main equation:   Education of child 
         












         












         
Cluster  673  673  901  901 
N  1,823  1,823  2,999  2,999 
R2  0.194  0.194  0.126  0.122 
   
First stage equation:   Schooling of parent 
         
Schooling of grandparent    0.241*** 
(0.023) 
[0.268] 
  0.236*** 
(0.017) 
[0.263] 
         
Schooling of great 
grandparent 
  0.224*** 
(0.040) 
[0.137] 
  0.203*** 
(0.029) 
[0.124] 
         
Cluster    673    901 
N    1,823    2,999 
R2    0.177    0.220 
         
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the family. 
 
Our results suggest that the standard Becker-Tomes model fails to capture how human 
capital is transmitted across generations. A natural extension is to consider a direct influence 
of grandparents on grandchildren and thus add grandparent‟s outcome, i.e.      , to equation 
(1). If this is done, one can derive a revised equation (3), where the coefficient on       
changes from –   to  –  . Hence, if   is large enough, we would find a positive sign on 
grandparents  outcome  in  a  regression  of  child‟s  outcome  on  parent‟s  and  grandparent‟s 
outcome.
18   
                                                       
18 In this revised regression model (3) we would also have great grandparents outcome as an added right-hand 
side variable (whose coefficient would be equal to –  ). Other simple extensions to the modeling framework in 
equations (1) and (2) are of course also possible. For example we could add      to equation (2), hence allowing 
for the endowment or cultural transmission to children to come from both parents and grandparents. This is more 
likely to give a positive coefficient on      the higher is the endowment transmission from grandparents relative 
the endowment transmission from the parents, and the lower is   in equation (1). Another example is to add an  
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5  Conclusions 
We  have  explored  intergenerational  transmission  of  economic  status  across  adjacent  and 
distant generations over the span of a century. Our data enable us to link great grand-parents 
born at the end of the 19
th century to great grand-children finishing their education in the early 
21
st century. We estimate intergenerational correlations in educational attainments between 
these  generations  and  income  correlations  between  the  first  generation  and  their  grand 
children.  Finally,  we  test  implications  of  the  well  known  Becker-Tomes  model  on 
intergenerational  transmission  of  human  capital  using  educational  attainments  of  the  first 
generation as an instrumental variable.  
We find a striking persistence in educational attainments across generations. There is a 
significant correlation between the educational attainments of the first generation and their 
great grand children. The great grand children of the people with more than just compulsory 
education in the first generation are 55 percent more likely to have university education than 
the  great  grand  children  of  those  with  compulsory  education  only.  People  in  the  highest 
quintile in the earnings distribution are more than twice as likely to have grand children in the 
highest income quintile as the rest of the population. 
From the estimates of the intergenerational correlations in both educational attainments 
and earnings we can reject simple extrapolations from correlations between adjacent cohorts 
to  more distant  ones  as suggested in  elementary  text  books  on labor  economics,  such as 
Borjas (2009). This implies that the persistence of income inequality across generations is 
stronger  than  we  would  expect  from  the  numerous  studies  on  mobility  in  earnings  and 
educational  attainments  using  only  two  generations.  Generations  before  the  parental 
generation seem to spill over in the process of human capital mobility across generations. 
In the final part of the empirical analysis we extend the estimates of intergenerational 
correlations to also have a causal interpretation of how the human capital of parents affects 
the outcome of their children. The most plausible interpretation of our rejection of the Becker-
Tomes model is that the model does not allow for a direct independent effect of generations 
beyond  the  parent  generation.  This  interpretation  is  compatible  with  our  results  from  the 
analysis of intergenerational correlations in the first empirical part of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interaction term        to equation (1), which would mean that endowment or culture is transmitted differently 
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Appendix: Institutional Background  
 
The four generations studied in this paper span a century during which Swedish society was 
transformed  from  early  industrialization  to  present  day  welfare  society.  While  subsidized 
childcare, generous child allowances, free schooling through high school, generous grants and 
loans  for  higher  education,  social  security,  unemployment  benefits,  free  health  care  and 
pensions constitute today‟s welfare system, society in Malmö in the beginning of the 20
th 
century had some, but not all of these institutions in place, when the parents of the initially 
sampled index generation grew up.  
Malmö  is  located  in  the  southern  part  of  Sweden.  It  was  and  is  by  population  size 
Sweden‟s third city. At the beginning of the 20th century Malmö grew at a rapid pace and 
tripled its population from 61,000 to 192,000 between 1900 and 1950, compared to today‟s 
300,000. Much of the population growth was a result of rapid urbanization. Malmö was early 
on one of the most industrialized cities in Sweden. When the original data collection of the 
Malmö  study  was  initiated,  in  1938,  three  large  employers  dominated.
19  After 1960, an 
increasing fraction was employed within the public sector and by 1980, 20% of the men and 
50% of the women held public sector jobs. 
In the early 20th century, Swedish compulsory schooling was only six years, but a seventh 
year of was introduced already in 1914 in Malmö. Yet, m any children kept leaving school 
after six  years.  Seven  years of schooling  only  become the norm  around 1920 when a 
municipal grant was introduced to compensate poor families for the lost earnings during the 
seventh  year of school.  This  grant  existed until 1936   when compulsory schooling  was 
extended  to  7  years  throughout  Sweden.  In  the  late  1930‟s  almost  a  third  of  all  Malmö 
children continued beyond compulsory schooling. School enrolment, was hence higher than 
in the rest of Sweden. Malmö was also the first large municipality to extend compulsory 
schooling to 9 years in 1962. Arguably, basic educational infrastructure was well developed 
and accessible already to the index-generation studied here. 
Since the 1920‟s, loans to help finance higher education were in principle available to the 
tiny fraction of young people qualified to studying at Universities. In the late 1950‟s student 
loans were also made available for studies at the high school level. The present day generous 
grant and loans program for university students was introduced in 1964. Since then, credit 
constraints are arguably unlikely to play a role for higher education choices. 
                                                       
19 Kockums, a shipbuilding company and mechanical workshop, with 2,300 employees; Skånska Cement, a construction 
company, with almost 2,000 employes; and Malmö strumpfabrik, a stocking factory, with more than 1,000 employees.  
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Although our sample is not a random sample from the Swedish population, Malmö was 
(and is) a fairly representative city in Sweden. This can be seen if we compare the earnings 
distribution  for  our  first  generation  from  Malmö  (using  our  sample)  with  the  earnings 
distribution for the entire county. To do this we use estimates of the earnings distribution 
obtained by Bentzel (1952), who used tax registers to construct measures of the Swedish 
income distribution. Figure 2 compares the earnings distribution of the first generation in our 
data in 1937 with those obtained by Bentzel for the years 1935 and 1945. It is interesting to 
note that the income distribution among the Malmö families does not deviate drastically from 
the national income distribution. 
Figure 2 A comparison of earnings distribution for the first generation in the Malmo 
data for 1937 with those obtained by Bentzel (1952) for Sweden in 1935 and 1945. 
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